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Abstract:  Using a theoretical model of two-candidate political competition under probabilistic voting, I study the 
effectiveness of the following anti-corruption reforms: (i) higher wages for politicians, (ii) higher penalties for 
political corruption, and (iii) constitutional constraints on the tax rates and the public good levels. In the setup I 
study, the competing candidates may differ in their popularity, (non-verifiable) ability, and corruptibility. I find that 
the reforms are more likely to be effective when the candidates are (almost) identical. When the candidates differ 
significantly from each other, each reform may increase equilibrium level of corruption or reduce voters' welfare. 
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 1 Introduction
It is not clear what the best way is to reduce political corruption. In this paper, I study
the e⁄ectiveness of three anti-corruption reforms: (i) higher salaries for politicians,
(ii) higher penalties for corruption, and (iii) constitutional constraints that limit the
size of the government. I ￿nd that none of these reforms is always e⁄ective; under
certain conditions each reform reduces voters￿welfare or increases corruption.
I study the e⁄ectiveness of these reforms in a setup in which two career politicians
compete with each other. For this I use an extended and generalized version of the
duopoly model of political agency provided by Polo (1998).1 The career politicians
in the model can di⁄er in terms of their (non-veri￿able) ability to produce the public
good, popularity, or corruptibility. Each candidate proposes a tax rate and a public
good level before the voting takes place; then, implements this policy when elected.
The voters care about both the ￿scal policy and other issues such as ideology and
candidate characteristics. Their preferences on these issues are subject to random
shocks: the voting is probabilistic. Each politician￿ s objective is to maximize his
expected rents: the legal rents (ego rents and the wage), and, if he decides to steal,
the illegal rents. In the model a corrupt politician may get caught. Then, there are
two di⁄erent types of penalties for corruption. The constant penalty is independent
of the amount stolen, and the variable penalty is proportional to the amount stolen.
Although there are penalties and although it would reduce the probability that he
wins the election, a corrupt politician may still choose to propose an ine¢ ciently high
tax rate or an ine¢ ciently low public good level and steal the di⁄erence between tax
revenues and actual public good costs. A politician￿ s incentives to steal increase in
his ability (or, popularity) advantage over his rival; in the extend of randomness in
voting behavior; and in the rival￿ s level of corruption (strategic complementarity). I
also consider the possibility that some politicians are honest.
To evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of the reforms I calculate comparative statics focus-
ing on the equilibria in which at least one candidate steals. A salary increase always
reduces the amount a candidate steals in equilibrium. Yet, since the taxpayers even-
tually ￿nance the wage bill, the reform is e⁄ective only when a one dollar increase
in the wage reduces the expected equilibrium level of corruption by more than one
dollar. I ￿nd that this is the case when the candidates are identical and when there
are no legal penalties for corruption.
When the variable penalty on illegal rents is low, a wage increase is not that
e⁄ective. Because, then, a corrupt candidate who gets caught certainly loses his wage,
but, he (e⁄ectively) keeps part of his illegal rents. If only one candidate is corrupt,
then the wage increase is even less likely to be welfare increasing. There are two
reasons for this. First, the higher wage paid to the honest candidate is a waste from
the voters￿point of view (he would not steal even without the wage increase). Second,
in this case the reform does not have a strategic e⁄ect. The strategic e⁄ect exists
1See Evrenk (2008a) for a detailed discussion of the model and its equilibria.
1when both candidates steal; then, each candidate￿ s level of corruption are strategic
complements. That is, a wage increase does reduce a candidate￿ s level of corruption
not only because it makes the o¢ ce more attractive, but also because it reduces the
other candidate￿ s level of corruption. When the rival is honest, this e⁄ect is absent.
If the legal penalties are not severe enough to eradicate corruption completely,
they may increase it. The intuition is that, then, an increase in the penalties reduce
the expected rents from the o¢ ce. A small increase in the constant penalty (almost)
always raises corruption and reduces voters￿welfare. An increase in variable penalty
reduces equilibrium level of corruption and increases voters￿welfare only when the
net expected legal rents (legal rents minus the constant penalty) is positive. Thus, a
higher variable penalty increases the e⁄ectiveness of the salary reform and a higher
salary increases the e⁄ectiveness of the penalty.
Brennan and Buchanan (1980, Ch. 10) discuss the e⁄ect of constitutional con-
straints on tax rates using a monopoly model of government for whom theft consti-
tutes the sole source of rents. In a setting with political competition and multiple
sources of rents, I ￿nd that there exists an e⁄ective tax constraint when the compet-
ing candidates are ex ante identical. When candidates have di⁄erent levels of ability,
however, the constraint may reduce voters￿welfare. To see why, note that, in equilib-
rium, an honest candidate who is able but unpopular can propose a tax rate higher
than the rate proposed by a dishonest, less able, but more popular candidate. Then,
a tax rate constraint that binds only for the honest candidate increases equilibrium
level of corruption and reduces voters￿welfare. A signi￿cantly low tax rate constraint
would bind for both candidates, but as it would enforce a public good level that is
too low compared to social optimum, it may reduce not only political corruption but
also the voters￿welfare.
I also show that a tax rate limit enforcing a small government is not the only
welfare-increasing ￿scal restraint; a constitutional constraint that enforces a large
public good level can also be welfare increasing. Further, when the candidates have
the same ability, the ￿rst-best ￿scal policy can be implemented only by a constitution
that imposes a binding upper bound on tax rate and a binding lower bound on public
good level.
Using an extended and generalized version of the incumbency model of politi-
cal agency, recently Besley and Smart (2007 p.764), too, study the e⁄ects of a tax
limitation on voter welfare. Their model could be further extended to study the ef-
fectiveness of the other reforms that I study here. It should be noted, however, that
the incumbency model and the duopoly model emphasize di⁄erent types of agency
problems. In their model the agency problem is due to imperfect information; in the
duopoly model it is due to imperfect competition. So, when the reforms work or fail
in each model, it is usually for di⁄erent reasons.
In their model, a voter decides between the current incumbent and a challenger.
She cannot observe their types (honest or corrupt); she only knows the proportion
of each type. She tries to infer the current incumbent￿ s type by also looking into his
2performance in the previous period (there are only two periods). An honest politician
would impose a high (low) tax rate when the cost of the public good is high (low).
The voter, however, cannot observe this cost parameter either. If, based on the ￿rst
period behavior of the incumbent, the voter decides that he is corrupt, then she votes
for the challenger. In his ￿rst period, a corrupt incumbent may steal everything,
then he will certainly be voted out (a separating equilibrium). Another possibility is
that he imposes a high tax rate when the cost of the public good is low, then steal
the di⁄erence (a pooling equilibrium). When she observes a high tax rate, the voter
re-elects the incumbent. Following his re-election, then, the corrupt incumbent steals
all he can in the second period.
Besley and Smart (2007, Proposition 3) shows that in this setup a tax-rate con-
straint may reduce the voter￿ s welfare because of a selection e⁄ect. That is, by limiting
the amount that a corrupt candidate can steal, the constraint may increase the cor-
rupt incumbent￿ s incentives to pool (that is, steal less in the ￿rst period). Then, the
voter is more likely to be deceived, increasing the probability of rampant corruption
in the second period.
The selection e⁄ect is absent in the duopoly model of political agency. In the
duopoly model, the voters look at the policies proposed by each candidate, because
these policies are relevant; the competing candidates are well known career politicians;
their election promises are credible. In the incumbency model the voter disregards the
policies that candidates propose in election. Further, in the incumbency model, there
is no ability di⁄erence between the candidates. Due to the ability di⁄erences in the
duopoly model, an honest candidate may choose a higher tax rate than a corrupt one
does in equilibrium, see Example 1 below. This, as I discuss in Section 3.3., explains
how the tax-rate constraint may reduce voters￿welfare in the duopoly model.
2 The Model
Consider a continuum of voters of measure one. Voter i has income Yi and F(Yi)
denotes the cumulative density of Yi. The average income is normalized to one, R
YidF(Yi) = 1. Each voter pays an income tax at ￿ at rate t and spends the rest of
his income on a private good sold at unit price, ci = (1 ￿ t)Yi. Collected taxes are
available to be used by the elected leader to produce a public good, g. Each voter￿ s
preferences over private and public goods are represented by the utility function,
U(ci;g) = I(ci) + H(g) (1)
where both I(:) and H(:) are strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous and twice
continuously di⁄erentiable functions from R+ to R. Each voter needs to consume at
least a small amount of each good: both I0(0) and H0(0) converges to in￿nity.
There are two competing candidates, j 2 f1;2g. In elections, ￿rst each candidate
simultaneously announces a policy platform, (tj;gj). Then, the voting takes place.
3The winner produces the public good from the available public funds using a tech-
nology that depends on his (non-veri￿able) ability, ￿j. For simplicity, I assume that
the public good production technology is linear. The net public funds used in the
production of public good is equal to collected tax revenues minus the salary of the
leader, w > 0, and an amount that he chooses to steal, sj. Thus, the winner produces
gj = (tj ￿ w ￿ sj)￿j. (2)
The competing candidates I study here are career politicians; honest or corrupt,
each candidate realizes the adverse e⁄ects of cheating on his election promises on his
future. Thus, the winner of the election implements the policy that he announced,
instead of stealing all the tax revenue after winning the election.2 (Although he keeps
his promises, as I discuss below, a corrupt politician may still promise a suboptimal
￿scal policy.)
Each candidate￿ s goal is to maximize his expected rents and each candidate￿ s
outside option is normalized to zero. In addition to salary, the winning candidate
receives ego rents, ￿, as well. Further, each candidate j knows that for each dollar he
steals from the public budget, a fraction, (1 ￿ ￿j) > 0, will be lost.3
A corrupt politician thinks that he will get caught and be punished with proba-
bility ￿ > 0. Then, he will be deprived of his position, lose the legal rents w and ￿,
and pay a legal penalty worth q + vsj, where q > 0 and v > 0. Thus, when he is
elected, j expects to receive
Rj(sj) = w + ￿ + 1fsj>0g[￿jsj ￿ (vsj + q + w + ￿)￿],
where 1fsj>0g is equal to 1 if sj > 0, and equal to 0 otherwise.
The voting is probabilistic: i votes for j when U
j
i > Uk






i = I((1 ￿ tj)Yi) + H(gj) + (j ￿ 1)(￿ + ￿2 + ￿i2). (3)
The term ￿ + ￿2 + ￿i2 in (3) captures the non￿ policy issues that a⁄ect the voting
decision: ￿ is the electorate￿ s average bias in favor of Candidate 2 and it is known ex
ante. From the candidates￿point of view, ￿2 and ￿i2 are independent random variables




2￿], where both 1
2￿ and 1
2￿ are assumed to be
su¢ ciently large but ￿nite. The ￿rst term, ￿2, re￿ ects a correlated preference shock,4
2Evrenk (2008b) studies an in￿nitely repeated but simpli￿ed version of this model, and proves
that when his discount factor is large enough, a corrupt candidate will keep his election promises.
The intuition is the same as in Barro (1974).
3The parameter ￿j is known as the ￿deadweight loss of corruption￿ . Also note that, setting ￿j = 0
allows us to consider a candidate who will never steal.
4Such as the candidate￿ s performance on a televised debate just before the elections; a scandal;
an unexpected success or failure of a policy that the candidate strongly defended in the past.
4while ￿i2 re￿ ects an idiosyncratic shock on individual i￿ s preferences. Let E[h(Yi)]
denote
R
h(Y i)dF(Yi) for any function h(:). The probability that j wins the election








Each candidate j chooses his equilibrium policy platform, (t￿
j;g￿
j), to maximize his
expected rents, ￿jRj. Let (t0
j;g0
j) denote the ￿rst-best policy platform, that is, the
platform that maximizes the voters￿expected welfare. Evrenk (2008a) shows that the
voters￿expected welfare can be written as





where k 6= j, and that the ￿rst-best involves no corruption, g0
j = (t0
j ￿ w)￿j, with
t0






To determine the equilibrium policy platforms one needs two ￿rst order conditions







= 0 for both j 2 f1;2g.
As ￿Rj is always larger than zero, in equilibrium each candidate chooses a tax rate
that maximizes voters￿expected welfare conditional on the amount he steals, sj.





(￿j)2H00((tj ￿ w ￿ sj)￿j)
E[Y 2
i I00((1 ￿ tj)Yi)] + (￿j)2H00((tj ￿ w ￿ sj)￿j)
. (5)
Similarly, there exists an equilibrium public good level function, g￿
j(sj) = ￿j(t￿
j(sj)￿





j.7 Also note that
dt￿
j(sj)
dsj is strictly between zero and one:
political corruption is ￿nanced by both ine¢ ciently high taxes and ine¢ ciently low
public good levels.
As (2) indicates, the variables tj, gj, and sj are interdependent. So, j￿ s second
policy variable can be considered either as gj or as sj. Choosing the latter, we ￿nd,
5See Evrenk (2008a) for the derivation.
6To derive (5), I di⁄erentiate
@E[Ui(:)]
@tj = 0 with respect to sj.
7This is due to our assumptions that (i) candidates do not have policy preferences; (ii) voters are
equally in￿ uential and equally well informed (￿i2 has the same support for all i); (iii) there are no
special interest lobbies.
5in equilibrium we should have
@￿jRj
@sj ￿ 0, i.e.,
￿Rj
@[H((tj ￿ w ￿ sj)￿j)]
@sj
+ (￿j ￿ ￿v)￿j ￿ 0 (with equality when s
￿
j > 0). (6)
Note that
@￿jRj
@sj is equal to a weighted average of two marginal gains: (i) the average
marginal disutility of voters from corruption (weighted by ￿Rj), and (ii) the marginal
increase in rents due to corruption (weighted by the probability that j will have the
opportunity to receive these rents). Further,
@￿jRj
@sj depends on sk (via ￿j): when
both candidates steal, the equilibrium corruption levels will be determined through
strategic interaction.
As the voter preferences are also part of the parameter space, at this level of
generality, the equilibrium of the model cannot be calculated in closed-form. Still,
the following result allows us to use comparative statics.
Theorem 1 (Evrenk 2008a, Propositions 2 and 3) The PSNE of the model al-
ways exists. When there is no legal punishment for corruption, the PSNE is unique.
When there is legal punishment, the game has at most two distinct (one interior, and
one corner) PSNE.
3 E⁄ectiveness of Reforms
In this section, I examine when (i) high salaries for the elected politician, (ii) high
penalties for corruption, and (iii) constitutional constraints on the size of the govern-
ment are e⁄ective in reducing corruption and increasing voters￿welfare. Each reform
either changes a parameter of the model (w, q, v) or adds another constraint in each
candidate￿ s optimization problem. To calculate the e⁄ectiveness of a given reform,
￿rst, I specify the type of the equilibrium (whether both candidates are stealing, CC,
or only one candidate is stealing, HC). For each j who steals, we have
@￿jRj
@sj = 0.
Then, by applying Implicit Function Theorem to these f.o.c.￿ s, I calculate how a given
change in one parameter (or, a constraint) a⁄ects the equilibrium level of corruption,
s￿




j), I calculate the e⁄ects of the reform on ￿scal policy,
and ￿nally, on voters￿welfare.
8I discuss the derivation of comparative statics in more detail in Evrenk (2008a). Note that,
even when the game has two equilibria, by Theorem 1, (i) they are not of the same type, and (ii)
these equilibria are distinct from each other. So, generically, a small change in a parameter or in
a constraint due to reform does not lead to a di⁄erent type of equilibria. (Non-generically, it does,
because there is a (measure zero) set of parameters under which an in￿nitesimal change leads to a
switch from multiple equilibria to a single equilibrium, or, vice versa.)
63.1 Salary Reform
E¢ ciency wages are proposed by many authors in the literature as a solution to high
level political corruption. For instance, Wittman (1995, p.27) argues that ￿...oppor-
tunism by politicians is mitigated when they are paid above-market salaries and then
threatened with losing the o¢ ce if they shirk￿ . Higher wages make winning the elec-
tion more attractive. In response, a candidate reduces the amount he steals.9 Still,
lower corruption does not necessarily mean higher welfare, as the wage increases have















is larger than zero. Intuitively, if we increase the wage candidate j receives by one
dollar, there is a bene￿t (a decrease in sj) as well as a cost (now there is one dollar less




dw < ￿1, then, the bene￿t is larger than the cost; it increases the
voters￿welfare from that candidate.11 Note that the net bene￿t from one candidate
a⁄ects voters￿welfare proportional to the likelihood of that candidate winning the
election. In CC, increasing the wage increases voters￿welfare,
dE[W]
dw > 0, only if
ds￿
j(w)
dw < ￿1 for at least one j, and if
ds￿
j(w)
dw < ￿1 for both j 2 f1;2g. The following
proposition provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions in terms of the parameters of
the model.
Proposition 1 If both candidates steal in equilibrium, then for a small increase in
wages to be welfare-increasing, a necessary condition is minf￿1;￿2g ￿ ￿v < 1 ￿ ￿,
while a su¢ cient condition is maxf￿1;￿2g ￿ ￿v < 1 ￿ ￿:
Less formally, Proposition 1 shows that when both candidates are corrupt, the
salary reform is welfare increasing only when stealing is not quite valuable for politi-
cians (or, when it is quite costly for them). To see the intuition, consider the symmet-
ric case. Then each candidate wins with equal probability in equilibrium. When the
wage increases one dollar, for each corrupt candidate, the expected bene￿t from this
extra dollar is equal to 1 ￿ ￿ (with probability ￿ the candidate will get caught and
will lose the wage). The expected bene￿t from a stolen dollar is equal to ￿ ￿ ￿v. A
corrupt candidate will give up the latter to get the former only when the net expected
9Although higher ego rents would have the same e⁄ect, it is easier to increase the monetary
compensation than rents based on psychological factors.
10Lemma 2 in Appendix provides the derivation for (7).
11In our model the set of competing candidates is ￿xed; a small increase in wage does not attract
better candidates to politics. For models of endogenous candidate quality, see Caselli and Morelli
(2004) and Messner and Polborn (2004).
7bene￿t, 1￿￿￿(￿￿￿v), is positive. The same intuition applies when both candidates
are corrupt, even if they are not identical.
When only one candidate steals, HC, however, a dollar increase in salary is less
likely to reduce equilibrium corruption more than a dollar:12
Lemma 1 When only Candidate j steals in equilibrium,
ds￿
j(w)
dw < ￿1 if and only if




j)) < (1 ￿ ￿).
As the careful reader notes, Lemma 1 provides only a necessary condition for the
salary reform to be e⁄ective in HC. This condition guarantees that
ds￿
j(w)
dw < ￿1, but,
in HC
dE[W]
dw is larger than zero only when
ds￿
j(w)







su¢ cient condition in HC is more strict14 is intuitive: in HC, the corrupt candidate
does not always win, and paying a higher wage to the honest candidate (who would
implement the ￿rst-best policy anyway) is a loss from the voters￿ point of view.
More surprising, Lemma 1 shows that in HC the necessary condition, too, is more
strict. That is, for
ds￿
j(w)




j)) < (1 ￿ ￿) in
HC, but in CC it would hold when (￿j ￿ ￿v) < (1 ￿ ￿). This di⁄erence is due to
existence of strategic interaction among the candidates. More speci￿c, it is because
the equilibrium levels of corruption are strategic complements when both candidates
steal. Since this strategic complementarity a⁄ects the e⁄ectiveness of any given reform
in the duopoly model of political agency, below, I discuss it in detail.15
In HC the honest candidate, say, Candidate 1, always proposes the ￿rst-best pol-
icy. Whether or not there is strategic interaction between the competing politicians,
the reform has a direct e⁄ect that will be captured by any type of agency model: the
corrupt Candidate 2 always responds to an increase in the salary: when w increases
by ￿w, winning becomes more attractive; so, Candidate 2 reduces s￿
2, say, by ￿s, to
increase the probability that he wins the election.
When both candidates steal, CC, the equilibrium corruption levels are strategic
complements; a wage increase has a strategic e⁄ect on s￿
2 as well: when the wage
increases (now, the corrupt) Candidate 1, too, steals less; s￿
1, too, decreases. Since ￿￿
2
depends on both s￿
1 and s￿
2, in this case Candidate 2 cannot achieve the same increase
in ￿2 by reducing his level of corruption by ￿s. He has to reduce s￿
2 further.




























@g ). By rearranging the terms, we get the





dw = 0, and
dE[Ui(:)]
dg = ￿kH0(g0
k), this condition can be obtained from (7). Note
that in our model, an increase in wages will not attract more able people to politics.
14That is, in this case a one dollar wage increase is e⁄ective only if it reduces equilibrium corruption
signi￿cantly more than one dollar .
15It is worth noting that strategic interaction is absent when a large number (continuum) of
candidates compete with each other.




j), so, we cannot calculate exactly how
much Candidate 2 should lower s￿





is close to one.16 Then, the existence of strategic complementarity (approximately)
doubles the upper bound on the expected bene￿t from a stolen dollar, ￿j ￿ ￿v, for
ds￿
j(w)
dw < ￿1 to hold.
3.2 Legal Penalties
Su¢ ciently harsh (expected) penalties for corruption would eliminate political cor-
ruption. When the expected gain from stealing is negative, a politician chooses not to
steal. So, increasing either ￿v (when ￿v > 1, the expected gain from stealing, ￿j￿￿v,
becomes negative) or ￿q (when the expected constant penalty is large enough, even
stealing the whole budget does not provide a net bene￿t) su¢ ciently would solve the
agency problem. Although harsh (expected) penalties could eliminate corruption, in
countries with widespread corruption, such penalties are not always feasible due to
administrative and legal constraints. When for example, most of the judges, prosecu-
tors, and investigators are corrupt, increasing the probability that a corrupt politician
is going to be punished, ￿, is not easy.17 A solution to the costly (or, ine⁄ective) au-
diting, suggested by Becker (1968), is to increase the penalty, v or q: this would make
law enforcement e⁄ective, despite the low probability of detection. Yet, again, if,
for instance, the judges themselves are corrupt, then the (corrupt) winner can use a
severe penalty for corruption to deter opposition and increase his corruption. Due to
such administrative constraints, signi￿cant increases in penalties may not be always
feasible. But, a small increase is always possible. I ￿nd, however, that it may be
counterproductive.
Proposition 2 An in￿nitesimal increase in the constant penalty, q, always leads to
more corruption. An in￿nitesimal increase in the variable penalty, v, leads to less
(more) corruption when the net expected legal rents are positive (negative), ￿q < (>
)(1 ￿ ￿)(w + ￿).
Proposition 2 can be easily proved by applying Implicit Function Theorem to
the equality
@￿jRj
@sj = 0. The intuition is that an increase in the constant penalty, q,






j ) is less






j ) is always equal to one.)
17In the Philippines, where two past presidents, Ferdinand Marcos and Joseph Estrada, are be-
lieved to have embezzled 5 to 10 billion and 78 to 80 million US dollars, Eufemio Domingo, the head
of the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, said that Phillipines has all the laws,
rules and regulations to eliminate corruption. But, he says, ￿[t]he problem is that these laws, rules
and regulations are not being faithfully implemented.￿Balgos (1998, p. 267-268), ￿ quoted in Quah
(1999).
9reduces the expected rents from o¢ ce. As a result, a corrupt politician puts a lower
weight on voters￿disutility from corruption (the ￿rst marginal bene￿t in (6)), and,
thus, steals more. We have the same e⁄ect for the variable penalty, v, as well. For v,
however, another e⁄ect works in the opposite direction: the higher the v, the lower
is ￿j ￿ ￿v, i.e., the expected penalty per dollar stolen increases. If the net expected
legal rents are positive, (1￿￿)(w +￿) > ￿q, then, as v increases, the relative weight
on voters￿disutility from corruption increases; the second e⁄ect dominates and the
equilibrium level of s￿
j decreases.
It is straightforward to derive the welfare e⁄ects of an increase in penalties. Since
a small increase in these penalties is costless, an in￿nitesimal increase in either the
constant or the variable penalty would be welfare increasing if and only if it reduces
equilibrium corruption. Thus, the conditions in Proposition 2 also characterize the
set of parameters under which increasing the penalty increases voters￿welfare.18
3.3 Constitutional Constraints
Geo⁄rey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1980) discuss how an individual member
of society who decides behind a ￿veil of ignorance￿would like to impose constraints
on the domain of the political outcomes.19 They discuss that when the policy maker
is a Leviathan, the exact opposite of the benevolent dictator, such constraints could
increase taxpayers￿welfare.20
The Leviathan cares only about its own welfare, and, more important, it does
not face any political competition. Note that this is a limit case of the duopoly
model: when the variance of the aggregate popularity shock converges to in￿nity (￿
converges to zero), a candidate￿ s policy has no e⁄ect on his probability of winning
the election; both candidates have equal chance. Then, political competition would
not restrict a candidate￿ s behavior. Except this special case, and however imperfect
it may be, political competition does restrict a candidate￿ s behavior. For this reason,
here, I study the e⁄ectiveness of constitutional constraints on tax rates and public
good levels when there is political competition.
Consider the e⁄ect of a constitution with the provision that the tax rate cannot ex-
ceed an upper bound, T.21 Candidate j￿ s optimization problem under this constraint
can be written as
max
sj;tj
￿jRj subject to tj ￿ T. (8)
18So, the optimal penalty scheme would have no (or a very small) constant penalty, and a sig-
ni￿cantly high variable penalty for corruption. Note, however, that a very high variable penalty is
feasible only if the administrative constraints mentioned above are not binding.
19For example, Proposition 13, approved by voters in California in 1978, restricts the tax on real
property to one percent of market value.
20See also Wilson (1989).
21Note that, in our model the aggregate income is constant. So, T can be considered as an
expenditure limit as well.
10First, note that a constraint on tax rate alone cannot implement the ￿rst-best.
Proposition 3 It is impossible to implement the ￿rst-best policy platform through
imposing only a tax-rate constraint.
Proof. When there is an upper limit on tj, the f.o.c. with respect to tj in a Nash
equilibrium is ￿Rj
@E[Ui((1￿tj)Yi;(tj￿w￿sj)￿j)]
@tj ￿ ￿j = 0, where ￿j is a Kuhn-Tucker mul-
tiplier satisfying ￿j(tj ￿T) = 0. Suppose that j is corrupt and that there exists a T
that implements the ￿rst-best. Then, in equilibrium the constraint has to be binding,
tj = T, and ￿j > 0. But, then, evaluated at the equilibrium tax rate, T, we have
@E[Ui((1￿tj)Yi;(tj￿w￿sj)￿j)]
@tj > 0, that is, E[YiI0((1￿T)Yi)] < ￿jH0((T ￿w￿sj(T))￿j). In
the ￿rst-best, however, we should have E[YiI0((1￿t0
j)Yi)] = ￿jH0(g0
j). Contradiction.
A tax rate constraint alone cannot implement the ￿rst-best; because, in addition to
its possible bene￿ts, it has a cost: an upper limit on tax rate reduces the equilibrium
level of public good. When we enforce the corrupt candidate to propose the ￿rst best
rate, he steals from the public good; he proposes a public good level that is less than
the ￿rst-best, g0
j. Yet, Proposition 3 does not mean that the constraint is totally
useless. It is still possible that the constraint implements a second-best.
Let us ￿rst study the e⁄ectiveness of T when the candidates are ex-ante identical
and corrupt, (then, I return to the case of unidentical candidates). With identical
candidates, the e⁄ect of a marginal change in T on voters￿welfare,
@E[W]






0((1 ￿ T)Yi)]. (9)
To evaluate (9), note that the second f.o.c. for (8),
@￿jRj
@sj = 0, implies that, for





Rj(s￿(T))￿H00(g(s￿(T);T)) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿v)H0 (g(s￿(T);T))
. (10)
H(:) is strictly concave, thus,
ds￿(T)
dT 2 (0;1). At the unconstrained equilibrium, we
have
@￿jRj
@tj = 0, thus, ￿H0(g￿) = E[YiI0(Yi(1￿t￿)]. Then, imposing a slightly binding
tax rate constraint is welfare increasing. That is,
@E[W]
@T < 0 at T = t￿. More formally,
Proposition 4 If the identical candidates steal in equilibrium, then there exists a
binding constraint on tax rates; this constraint reduces corruption and increases voters
welfare.
Intuitively, a tax rate constraint reduces corruption because for a given s￿, a bind-
ing constraint lowers the public good level a candidate can provide, raising marginal
utility of public good, and thus increasing the voters￿marginal disutility from cor-
ruption. Then, the cost of stealing last dollar (in terms of votes foregone) becomes
11higher, the candidate steals less. A slightly binding constraint increases voters￿wel-
fare, because, at the margin, the bene￿t from higher private good consumption due
to the lower tax rate compensates the lower public good level. When the candidates
are not identical, however, this is not necessarily the case.
When the candidates are not identical, (generically) each candidate proposes a
di⁄erent tax rate in equilibrium. Then, the candidate who proposes the higher tax
rate, say Candidate 1, can easily be targeted by choosing an appropriate constraint.
The constraint would be very e⁄ective if Candidate 1 is proposing higher taxes because
he is corrupt, and Candidate 2 is proposing lower taxes because he is honest. But,
the opposite case is also possible. If his ability to produce public good is lower, then
a corrupt Candidate 2 who happens to be popular with the voters may propose lower
tax rates in equilibrium. That is, we may have t￿
2 < t￿
1 even when s￿
2 > s￿
1 = 0.22 If
this is the case, then a constitutional constraint that is binding only for the honest
candidate will always be counterproductive.
Proposition 5 If only Candidate 2 is corrupt with t￿
2 < t￿
1, then a tax rate constraint
that binds only for Candidate 1 reduces voters￿welfare and increases corruption.
I prove Proposition 5 in the Appendix. To see the intuition, note that (i) the
constraint will tie the hands of the clean candidate, now he has to o⁄er a suboptimal
policy platform (the direct e⁄ect), and (ii) as Candidate 1 one cannot o⁄er the optimal
platform anymore, Candidate 2￿ s popularity advantage becomes more prominent (for
a given level of s￿
2, ￿2 and, thus,
@￿2R2
@s2 will increase); so, he will steal more (the strategic
e⁄ect). Both e⁄ects lead to a decrease in voters￿welfare, but only the strategic e⁄ect
leads to an increase in equilibrium level of corruption.
We ￿nd that reducing the T lowers the voters￿welfare as long as the tax-rate
constraint binds only for the honest candidate. Let us consider a constraint low
enough that it just binds for both candidates, T = t￿
2(T). Reducing the tax-rate
constraint below this point may reduce or increase corruption. The constraint reduces
the level of public good that Candidate 2 can provide, thus, for the reasons we discuss
following Proposition 4, he has incentives to steal less. At the same time, it ties the
hands of the honest candidate further (now he has to propose a ￿scal policy further
away from the optimal policy), thus, Candidate 2 has incentives to steal more as
well. Analytically, it is di¢ cult to determine if candidate 2 ends up stealing more or
less. Yet, as Example 1 below shows, even when a lower T reduces corruption, the
constraint may still be undesirable.





￿1 = 7=10, ￿2 = 1=2, ￿ = 1=100, ￿ = 2, ￿1 = 0, ￿2 = 0:4, ￿ = 0, w = 0, ￿ = 1=10.
Then,23 t￿
1 = t0
1 = 0:4118, and g￿
1 = g0
1 = 49=170; but t￿
2 = 0:3475 and g￿
2 = 0:1631. In
equilibrium, the popular candidate steals 2:12 percent of total income: s￿
2 = 0:0212.
22See, for instance, Example 1 below.
23These values are rounded after the fourth digit.
12Yet, due to his popularity advantage (￿ = 1=100), he still has a 33:57 percent chance
of winning the election. Any T 2 [0:4118;0:3488] binds only for the honest Candidate
1, and as Proposition 5 shows, in this region, the lower the T, the higher are both ￿￿
2
and s￿
2. When T < 0:3488, the constraint binds for both candidates. In this region,
reducing T reduces s￿
2. However, at the same time, it reduces the voter welfare as
well. This is because, for it to bind for both candidates, the constraint should be
signi￿cantly lower than the ￿rst-best tax rate for Candidate 1, t0
1. Although such a
low T reduces corruption, it also forces the honest (and, high ability) candidate to
produce the public good using a level of public funds that is signi￿cantly less than
the optimal level. The welfare loss resulting from this ine¢ ciency, however, is larger
than any welfare gain due to lower corruption that the tax-rate limit brings.24 Thus,
with unidentical candidates, it is possible that any tax-rate constraint (whether it
binds for one or two candidates) reduces voters￿welfare.
Next, let us consider another constitutional constraint, one that has received little
attention from economists25: a lower limit on the public good level, G. Then, each
candidate j￿ s optimization problem becomes
max
sj;tj
￿jRj subject to (tj ￿ w ￿ sj)￿j ￿ G.
The way G works is similar to the way T works. First, it is straightforward to show
that using only a minimum public good level constraint, the ￿rst best cannot be
implemented (that is, one can extend Proposition 3 to constraints on public good
levels). Second, when candidates are ex-ante identical, there exists a G that would
implement a second-best allocation. Following the steps that led to Proposition 4,























i)] ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿v)E[YiI0(c￿
i)]
:




dG < 0. Since in the unconstrained equilibrium we have ￿H0(g￿) =
E[YiI0((1￿t)Yi)], imposing a binding limit would increase voters￿welfare.26 That is,
24The Mathematica notebook for the calculations is available from the author upon request.
25To my knowledge, Inman (1985) is the ￿rst (and the only) one to consider a similar limit. In
his discussion of limits imposed by citizens on a bureaucrat￿ politician with monopoly power, Inman
(1985, p.750) considers a contract that allows the monopolist to choose the public good level only
from a given interval.
26Again, intuitively, a binding G reduces corruption because it increases the taxes, reducing after
tax income, and increasing the marginal utility of private good consumption for a voter. And,
again, a slightly binding limit increases voters￿welfare because, at the margin, voters￿gain from less
stealing is larger than their loss from higher taxes. Note that the public good limits would not work
13we have
@E[W]
@G > 0 at G = g￿, or, more formally:
Proposition 6 If the identical candidates steal in equilibrium, then there exists a
binding lower limit on the size of public good such that imposing this limit reduces
corruption and increases voters￿welfare.
Less formally, Proposition 6 shows that with identical candidates, another (second-
best) solution to political corruption is a constitution that enforces a large govern-
ment. When the candidates are identical, however, imposing only one constraint is
clearly suboptimal.
Proposition 7 If the candidates have identical ability, then constitutional constraints
on both the tax rates and public good levels are enough to implement the ￿rst-best.





2 = g0 (￿rst-best ￿scal policy does not depend on a candidate￿ s popularity).
Then, by simply setting T = t0, and G = g0 one can implement the optimal ￿scal
policy.
In the special case of ￿1 = ￿2, and, only in this case, there is no need for a penalty
against corruption or any salary for the politicians. When candidates di⁄er in their
ability, however, the ￿rst-best policy platforms are candidate speci￿c; there is a total
of four optimal policy variables. Only two instruments are not enough to implement
that optimum. For this case, again, one can extend Proposition 5 and show that a G
that binds only for the honest candidate is welfare reducing and corruption increasing.
Similarly, one can provide a numerical example showing that there exists parameters
under which any G alone could reduce voters￿welfare.
To summarize, imposing a constitutional constraint only on the tax-rate (the
public good level) is only partially e⁄ective when the candidates have the same ability.
Yet, when the candidates di⁄er in their ability and ethics, using only one constraint
may reduce voters￿welfare. When the candidates have the same level of ability one
can implement the ￿rst best by using both constrains. When ￿1 6= ￿2, even both
constraints are not enough to implement the ￿rst-best.
4 Conclusion
In a series of papers, I study the political economy of anti-corruption reform in coun-
tries in which political competition is among a small set of career politicians. In
several countries a few politicians dominate political arena for a long time, for some
examples, see Evrenk (2008a).
had one consider a very common speci￿cation: voters with quasi-linear preferences where marginal
utility from private good consumption is constant.
14In this paper, I study the e⁄ectiveness of some commonly discussed anti-corruption
reforms. Although each reform may be e⁄ective under certain conditions, I ￿nd
that each reform may increase corruption or reduce the voters￿welfare as well. The
conditions under which the reforms are ine⁄ective, such as candidates who di⁄er in
their ability, popularity or corruptibility and ine⁄ective law enforcement are not rare.
Thus, before implementing any of these reforms, the speci￿c conditions of the country
in question has to be studied.
There is another issue with implementation that requires further discussion: the
political support for the reform. A reform may increase welfare, yet it may not
have enough political support. The politicians￿and the voters￿incentives to support
an e⁄ective reform have been studied in (respectively) Evrenk (2008b) and Evrenk
(2008c). To combat political corruption, one needs carefully designed policies taking




































































Proof of Proposition 1. Note that the derivative of
@E[Ui((1￿tj)Yi;￿j(tj￿w￿sj))]
@tj with
respect sj is equal to the derivative with respect to wage, w. Then, di⁄erentiating
both
@￿1R1
@si = 0 and
@￿2R2


















































15Both stealing and wages reduce the available public funds: an increase in legal and


















@sj@sk ￿Aj, where Aj = ￿j￿[1￿￿￿￿j+￿v]H0(g￿
j).
Using this in (11), we have
dsj




(@sk)2 Aj > 0. By Lemma 3 from
Evrenk (2004), at equilibrium, we have
@2(￿jRj)
@sj@sk > 0 and
@2(￿kRk)
(@sk)2 < 0: Thus minfAk;




Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that k 6= j is the only candidate who steals when




j = 0. Below, I show
that a T that binds only for j reduces both E[Uk
i ] and ￿j (these two together imply
that it reduces E[W]). Note that under a tax rate constraint, j proposes the policy
platform (T;(T ￿ w)￿j). The policy platform that k proposes is determined by the







k ￿ w ￿ s
￿
k)￿k) = 0, (12)
and
(￿k ￿ ￿v)￿k ￿ Rk￿￿kH
0((t
￿
k ￿ w ￿ s
￿
k)￿k) = 0, (13)
where ￿k = 1
2 + ￿(E[I((1 ￿ t￿
k)Yi) ￿ I((1 ￿ T)Yi)] + H((t￿
k ￿ w ￿ s￿
k)￿k) ￿ H((T ￿
w)￿j) + 2￿(3






k ￿ w ￿ s￿
k)￿k)
(￿k)2H00((t￿
k ￿ w ￿ s￿











￿(￿k ￿ ￿v)(E[YiI0((1 ￿ T)Yi) + H0((T ￿ w)￿j)￿j)￿
2(￿k ￿ ￿v)￿￿kH0((t￿



















dT > 0, note that ￿j = 1 ￿ ￿k. Thus, it su¢ ces to show that
d￿k
dT < 0.























dT < 0, and that the expression in the brackets is positive as both
I(:) and H(:) are strictly concave.
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